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17 January, 2019

Reflections on China’s Stalinist Heritage I: A Tyrant's Toolkit

Rainer Hachfeld, Stalin-Mao-Xi, originally published 12 March, 2018.

The State is a machine in the hands of the governing class for suppressing the resistance of its class antagonists. In this way the dictatorship of the proletariat differs in no way essentially from the dictatorship of any other class.
—Joseph Stalin (1937)

Over at Sinocism, Bill Bishop has published the full text of an address John Garnaut gave to the Asian Strategy and Economics forum back in 2017. Garnaut titled his address “Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping's China.” The speech is an important distillation of many of the same themes that I have been writing about recently, especially on twitter.
 
Garnaut anchors his understanding of the Communist Party of China in its’ Stalinist heritage:
Mao knew Marxist Leninist dogma was absolutely crucial to his enterprise but he personally lacked the patience to wade through it. He found a shortcut to ideological proficiency with Joseph Stalin’s Short Course on the History of the Bolsheviks, published at the end of Stalin’s Great Terror, in 1938. According to Li Rui, when interviewed by historian Li Huayu, Mao thought he’d found an “encyclopaedia of Marxism” and “acted as if he’d discovered a treasure.”
At the time of Stalin’s death, in March 1953, The Short Course on the History of the Bolsheviks had become the third-most printed book in human history. After Stalin’s death - when Stalin was eulogised as “the Great Genius” on the front page of the People’s Daily - the Chinese printers redoubled their efforts. It became the closest thing in China to a religious text….
Stalin’s Short Course is a manual for perpetual struggle against a roll call of imagined dastardly enemies who are collaborating with imagined Western agents to restore bourgeois capitalism and liberalism. It is written as a chronicle of victories by Lenin and then Stalin’s “correct line” over an endless succession of ideological villains. It is perhaps instructive that many of the most “vile” internal enemies were said to have cloaked their subversive intentions in the guise of “reform.”
The practical utility of the book is that it prescribes an antidote to the calcification and putrefaction that inevitably corrodes and degrades every dictatorship.
The most original insight in Stalin’s Short Course on the History of the Bolsheviks is that the path to socialist utopia will always be obstructed by enemies who want to restore bourgeois capitalism from inside the party. These internal enemies grow more desperate and more dangerous as they grow increasingly imperilled - and as they collaborate with the spies and agents of Western liberalism.
The most important lines in the book:
  •  “As the revolution deepens, class struggle intensifies.”
  •  “The Party becomes strong by purging itself.”
You can imagine how this formulation was revelatory to a ruthless Chinese leader like Mao who had mastered the “You Die, I Live” world into which he had been born - a world in which you choose to either kill or be killed - and who was obsessed with how to prevent the decay which had destroyed every imperial dynasty before.
What Stalin offered Mao was not only a manual for purging his peers but also an explanation of why it was necessary. Purging his rivals was the only way a vanguard party could “purify” itself, remain true to its revolutionary nature and prevent a capitalist restoration.
Purging was the mechanism for the Chinese Communist Party to achieve ever greater “unity” with revolutionary “truth” as interpreted by Mao. It is the mechanism for preventing the process of corruption and putrefaction which inevitably sets in after the founding leaders of each dynasty leave the scene.
Crucially, Mao split with Kruschev because Kruschev split with Stalin and everything he stood for. The Sino-Soviet split was ideological - it was Mao’s claim to ideological leadership over the communist world. Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao. It was Mao’s claim to being Stalin’s true successor.
We hear a lot about how Xi and his peers blame Gorbachev for the collapse of the Soviet state but actually their grievances go much further back. They blame Kruschev. They blame Kruschev for breaking with Stalin. And they vow that they will never do to Mao what Kruschev did to Stalin.[1]

At first glance, equating Xi Jinping with Stalin seems absurd: Stalin, like Mao, is on the short list for “most terrible mass murderers in human history.” Xi has no compunctions about state sanctioned murder, but his victims are in the thousands (or perhaps if we include desperate suicides of corrupt officials, tens of thousands), not tens of millions. Stalin and Mao believed in the collectivization of all things. Economic policy under Xi, though more centralized and state directed than in the Dengist era, isn't comparable to Mao's economic program. Xi Jinping does not threaten another great famine. Stalin and Mao were chaos machines: their reign was marked by constant, unending upheaval. This upheaval stretched from the highest echelons of power down to the smallest of villages. The watchword of the Xi’s new era, in contrast, is “stability maintenance” (weiwen). The modern Party is an enemy to chaos.

Yet a focus on what makes Xi and his Party different from the Party of Mao and Stalin’s day obscures as much as it reveals. Xi Jinping and his cohort are heirs to the Communist tradition. The structure of the Party itself, the manner in which decisions are made, the way threats to the regime are assessed, and the tools the Party uses to subvert and overcome these threats share a distinct and undeniable symmetry with the methods and structures of the Party at its dawn. Direct lines can be drawn from the Party Mao made his own in the 1940s and the Party Xi made his own seven decades later.

One of the most important legacies of the Maoist era are the techniques Mao developed to deal with individuals and groups that threatened to derail The Cause. These techniques had clear antecedents in the Soviet experience, but for the Chinese they came together in the forge of Yenan. The first of these techniques usually went under the label “united front.” United front work was what you did with organizations, movements, and groups who might threaten the Cause, but who the Party could not yet afford to openly challenge. United front work was a mix of infiltration, subversion, propaganda, bribery, and false promises. Mao’s pledges of “New Democracy” and the Party’s successful propaganda and “diplomatic matters” (waijiao shiwu) campaigns with American observers in the 1940s are some of the most prominent examples from that time. Key to this work is a candied eye for what Party leaders would today call “win-win” propositions. Both sides win, then win, then win some more—until the Party is in position to impose a decisive win-lose on the other group in question.[2]

“Losing” often meant struggle. It was through a struggle campaign unleashed against the Party itself (the “Yanan Rectification movement”) that Mao was able to take control the early 1940s and ensure that Mao Zedong Thought became the official line of the Communist Party of China. Mao did this through a system of purges, executions, arbitrary detentions, coerced (and usually public) self-denunciations, coerced (and usually public) denunciations of others, coercive cadre examinations, thought control, an endless mill of written self-criticisms, and forced labor. The goal of all this, as Garnaut notes in his speech, was not:
to “persuade” so much as “condition”. By creating a fully enclosed system, controlling all incentives and disincentives, and “breaking” individuals physically, socially and psychologically, they found they could condition the human mind in the same way that Pavlov had learned to condition dogs in a Moscow laboratory a few years earlier. [3]
After the Party seized power in 1949, Mao would systematically apply the same techniques to one group of Chinese after another: “landlords” and village leadership; gamblers, gangsters, and criminals; Christian congregations, Daoist temples and the Buddhist sangha; business circles, corporations, and stock-jobbers; universities, schools, and intellectual clubs; hospitals, aid workers, and relief organizations; minor political parties and independent political groups; workers associations and unions; clan groupings and ancestral schools; martial artists and Confucian hold-overs—any set of organized and self-governing citizens was soon a target of a struggle campaign. In time each would be destroyed or brought into a subservient relationship with the Communist Party. [4]

One of the extraordinary things about reading Mao’s speeches from this period is the fluidity of who was considered an ally and who was considered an enemy. Mao framed his campaigns as a struggle between “the people” and “the enemy,” but who fit into each group differed drastically based off of the Party’s perceptions of who was a credible threat to The Cause and who was not. As Mao put it:
To understand these two different types of contradictions correctly, we must first be clear on what is meant by "the people" and what is meant by "the enemy". The concept of "the people" varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in a given country. Take our own country for example. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, all those classes, strata and social groups opposing Japanese aggression came within the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, their Chinese collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements were all enemies of the people. During the War of Liberation, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs -- the bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Kuomintang reactionaries who represented these two classes -- were the enemies of the people, while the other classes, strata and social groups, which opposed them, all came within the category of the people. At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people.[5]
Thus a particular group could at one point be an honored part of “the people,” at another point an ally in a “united front,” and later a despised “enemy” of the regime. How the regime treated you depended very much on how threatening Party leaders believed you might be to the regime and its cause.

Today The Cause has flipped—officially—from socialist revolution to national rejuvenation. The Party works under the same schema but has shifted the “people” that Mao identified with specific economic classes to the nation at large.[6] Mass mobilization campaigns have been retired. But struggle and united front campaigns have not. Xi’s great corruption purge, the Uyghur labor camps of Xinjiang, the attack on Christians across China—these all follow the same methods for crushing and coercing “enemies” developed by Mao and the Party in the early ‘40s. “One Country, Two Systems,” interference campaigns in the Chinese diaspora, the guided, gilded tours given to Musk and his ilk—these all follow the same methods for corrupting and controlling “allies” developed by Mao and the Party that same decade. The tools have never changed. The only thing that has changed is the Party’s assessment of who is an "enemy" and who is part of the "people."

There is one threat, however, that the Communist legacy has poorly prepared the Party to face. Stalin and Mao conceived of their projects in cultural terms—they were not just attempting to stamp out dangerous people, but dangerous ideas. To that end both Stalin and Mao cut their countries off from the world they had no control over. If your end goal is socialist revolution this might be tenable. But if your end goal is national rejuvenation—that is, a future where China sits at the top of a global order, more wealthy and powerful than any other—then engagement with the outside world must be had. It means foreigners coming to China in great numbers, and Chinese going abroad in numbers no smaller. It means a much more accurate conception of the way the rest of the world works among the minds of the Chinese people. It means contemplating paths for China that do not involve being ruled by a dictatorial party-state.

This tension lies at the root of the Party’s problems with the West. Countries like America threaten the Party with their mere existence. Consider what these countries do: they allow dissidents from authoritarian powers shelter. Their societies spawn (even when official government policy is neutral on the question) movement after movement devoted to spreading Western ideals and ideas to other lands and peoples. They are living proof that a country does not need a one-party state to become powerful and wealthy. These things pose a threat to the Communist Party of China. The Party itself is the first to admit it. [7]

But what can they do about it? In essence, they have two main options. The first is retreat and retrenchment. If enough walls can be thrown between China and the world, then the cultural threat posed by the West may be managed. We already see this, to an extent. We shall likely see more of it. While I doubt we will see the sort of economic retrenchment that marked Stalin’s reign, I would not be surprised if we see a more limited quest for autarky, the type that led Japan on its own path to totalitarian rule.[8] 

The second option is to face the threat head on. This is the impetus behind China’s “influence” and “interference” campaigns. The Party will do what it can to keep PRC citizens abroad from being influenced by the ideological enemies of its regime. It will also do what it can to destabilize and subvert the societies whose existence threatens their rule and whose threat legitimizes their regime. As Garnaut notes in his piece:
The Western conspiracy to infiltrate, subvert and overthrow the People’s Party is not contingent on what any particular Western country thinks or does. It is an equation, a mathematical identity: the CCP exists and therefore it is under attack. No amount of accommodation and reassurance can ever be enough - it can only ever be a tactic, a ruse.
Without the conspiracy of Western liberalism the CCP loses its reason for existence. There would be no need to maintain a vanguard party. Mr Xi might as well let his party peacefully evolve.[9]

With this I agree entirely. The implications of realization are wide-reaching. I encourage you to explore them.

That is it for today. Tomorrow or the day after I will have a follow up post where I outline a few of the points where I disagree with Garnaut's take on the 21st century Communist Party of China.



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[1] John Garnat, "Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping's China," speech given at the Asian Strategy and Economic Forum, 21 August 2017, posted at Sinocism on 16 January 2019.

[2] On waishi work see Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic (Washington DC: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), ch. I-III. On the bureaucracy of the United Front, see the introduction of Brady,  “Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping,” Wilson Center report, 18 September 2017.

[3] Garnaut, "Engineers of the Soul."

[4] A very readable history of all this: Frank Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation, 1945-1957 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).

[5] Mao Zedong, "On the Correct handling of Contradictions Among the People," a highly edited version of a speech originally given in the 11th Session of the Supreme State Conference in February 1957. This version was published in the People's Daily on June 19, 1957.

[6] Timothy Heath, "China's New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation," address for the USC UC-China Institute, 29 January 2015.

[7] For a summary of many statements, see Matthew Johnson, “Securitizing Culture in Post-Deng China: An Evolving National Strategic Paradigm, 1994-2014,” Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts 4, iss. 1 (2017), 62-80. The issue is also treated well in Samantha Hoffman, "Programming China: the Communist Party’s autonomic approach to managing state security," PhD diss, University of Nottingham (2017), ch II.

[8] On Stalin's retrenchment and possible comparisons with Xi, Andrew Batson has an interesting post: "Xi vs. Stalin: What Drives the Reversal of Economic Reforms," Andrew Batson's Blog, 7 January 2019. On Japan see Michael Barhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 19.

[9] Garnaut, "Engineers of the Soul."

01 January, 2019

Every Book I Read in 2018


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A new year has arrived, and that means it is time to post my annual list of every book I have finished since the last new year's day. I have kept a list of every book I have read, along with a few short comments summarizing and casting judgment on each title, since 2010 (you can see my lists for 2013-2017 here, here, here, here and here). As in past years I have bolded and linked to the Amazon page of the ten best titles of the year. Only books that I read for the first time in 2018 qualify for inclusion in this category. As is usual, the books are listed in the order in which I finished, not started the title. If a book is repeated, it is because I read it twice. A more condensed list of books that I started but did not finish can be found at the bottom of the post.

Two books in particular were the stand outs of 2018. The first is F.W. Mote's Imperial China, 900-1800. I have owned this book for sometime, usually consulting it as sort of a reference whenever I was reading another book about one of the dynasties covered therein. After lugging it across Asia with me for several years, I decided this summer to finally read it cover to cover. I am glad I did so. I cannot speak words glad as this book deserves. With perhaps the exception of Daniel Walker Howe's What God Hath Wrought or William Freehling's Road to Disunion, I have never read any other history that so effectively traces the connections between social, cultural, and political history. But Howe and Freehling do this on a smaller scale, a few decades in time. Mote does it for a millennia of human history. Just as remarkable is Mote's ability manages to marry large-scale macro-historical analysis with personal (and often poignant) assessments of Chinese historical figures.

I really cannot recommend this book enough. If only get ten books on a deserted island, this is one of them.

The second book is Robert Sapolsky's Behave: The Biology of Humans at our Best and Worst. This book is only a hair short of a masterpiece. Sapolsky is a unique character: both a neuro-endocrinologist (that is, a scientist who studies how hormones affect the brain) and a primate ethnologist (a scientist who observes monkeys or apes in the wild), Sapolsky has a strong cross-disciplinary perspective on the topics he covers. Sapolsky is also a very gifted writer. In this book he takes a crack at the neuroscience, endocrinology, genetics, and evolutionary history of human social behavior.

The book is wide ranging. So wide ranging that it has a few rough patches that don't quite live up to the rest of the work's quality. The chapter on priming and behavior in particular is a bad pitch, relying as it does on work from social psych that has failed to replicate. But the first 200 pages or so, which describe the inner workings of the brain and the neuroscience of human decision making, are the most valuable 200 pages I have read all year.

I am also impressed with how Sapolsky frames the way the different systems studied in neuroscience, endocrinology, social psychology, behavioral genetics, and evolutionary anthropology overlap and intersect with each other. This framing is unique and powerful. My personal take is that anyone involved the behavioral or social sciences—that is, the sciences that study why humans do what they do—must read this book.

Also: As Sapolsky is something of a raging leftist hippie (and it quite open about this in the book),  I have hope that Behave can be used to help those social scientists whose political commitments keep them suspicious of evolutionary takes on human behavior to reconsider these doubts. This is a book worth sharing.

EVERY BOOK I READ IN 2018

Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, upd. ed., (New York: Harpers, 2015). 

Epictetus, Handbook, trans. George Long (London: Dover Thrift: 2006).

Honore Balzac, Old Man Goriot trans. Olivia McCannon (New York: Penguin, 2011). 

Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front: A Novel, trans. Arthur Wesley Wheen (New York: Rando House, 2011). 

Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 

Caroline Alexander, trans., The Iliad: A New Translation (New York: Ecco Press, 2015).


Caroline Alexander, The War that Killed Achilles: The True Story of Homer’s Iliad and the Trojan War (New York: Penguin, 2009).

Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Eva Brann, Homeric Moments: Clues to Delight When Reading the Odyssey and the Iliad (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2008).

Christopher Logue, War Music: An Account of Homer’s Iliad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016).


Earnst Junger, Storm of Steel, trans. Michael Hoffman (New York: Penguin Books, 2016). 

Bela Zombory-Moldovan, The Burning of the World: A Memoir of 1914, trans. Peter Zombory-Moldovan (New York: New York Review Books, 2017).

James Stockdale, Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior (Washington DC: Hoover Institute, 1993).

Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Robert Fagles, trans., The Iliad, (New York: Penguin Books, 1998).c

Neil Irving Painter, Standing at Armageddon: A Grassroots History of the Progressive Era (New York: W.W.W. Norton, 2018).

G.K. Chesterton, Heretics (London: Dover, 1905).

John Dryden, Fables Ancient and Modern in Delphi Complete Works of John Dryden (Delphi Classics, 2013). 

David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York: Basic Books, 2009). 


Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s (Open Road Media, 2015).


Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931 (New York: Penguin, 2014).

Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression and New Deal: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland rev. ed. (New York: Harper, 2017). 

Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front: A Novel, trans. Arthur Wesley Wheen (New York: Rando House, 2011). 

Honore Balzac, Old Man Goriot, trans. Olivia McCannon (New York: Penguin, 2011). 

Victor Frankl, Man’s Search For Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005).

John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York City: Vintage Books, 1989). 

Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday trans., B. W. Huebsch and Helmut Ripperger (Plunkett Press, 2011).

Edward Bolland Osborn, eds., The Muse at War (London: Murray, 1917).

William Golding, Lord of the Flies (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).

Antulio J Echevarria, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 

Michael O’Shea, The Brain: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Richard Passignham, Cognitive Neuroscience: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Robert Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at our Best and Worst (New York: Penguin Books, 2017).


Pascal Boyer, Minds Make Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

Kenneth Payne, The Psychology of Strategy: Exploring Rationality in the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).  [Book review here.]

Kenneth Payne, Strategy, Evolution, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).  [Book review here.]

Roberto Foa, “Ancient Polities, Modern States,” PhD diss (Harvard: 2016). [Related post here].

Peter England, The Beauty and the Sorrow: An Intimate History of the First World War, trans. Peter Graves. (Vintage, New York: 2011).

Christopher C. Rand, Military Thought in Early China (Albany: SUNY Press, 2017). 

Moheb Costandi, Neuroplasticity (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 2016). 

Cecilia Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets: The Cultural Evolution of Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). [Related tweet stream here].


David S. Moore, Basic Practice of Statistics, 5th ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2009). 

William Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew in Globe Illustrated Shakespeare (New York: Greenwhich House, 1983), pp.223-281.

Jared Rubin, Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not (Cambridge: Cabridge University Press, 2017). [Related post here].

Human Rights Watch, Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2018). [Related post here].

Zack Cooper, Understanding the Chinese Communist Party’s Approach to Cyber-Enhanced Economic Warfare (Washington DC: FDD Press, 2018).

ETS, Official GRE Quantitative Reasoning Questions, Volume I, 2nd ed (New York City: McGraw Hill, 2017). 

ETS, Official GRE Verbal Reasoning Questions, Volume 1, (New York City: McGraw Hill, 2017). 

Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2018 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2018)

Olivier Morin, How Traditions Live and Die. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 

Jeffrey Eggstrom, Systems Confrontation and Systems Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese’s Peoples Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Sant Monica: RAND Corp, 2018).

Thomas Mahnken, Ross Babbage, and Toshi Yoshihara, Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2018).

David A Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900 (New York: Routledge, 2002).

Manhattan Prep, 5 lb. Book of GRE Practice Problems, 2nd ed (2017: Manhattan Prep Publishing, 2015).

Joseph Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). [Related post here].

Cao Xueqin, The Story of the Stone, or The Dream of the Red Chamber, vol I: The Golden Days, trans. David Hawkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1974).

Nadege Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Washinton DC: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2016).

Cao Xueqin, The Story of the Stone, or The Dream of the Red Chamber, vol II: The Crab Flower Club, trans. David Hawkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1974).

Fyodor Dostoesky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Sydney Monas (New York: Penguin Books, 1968).

Anastasya Lloyd-Damnjanovic, A Preliminary Study of PRC Political Influence and Interference in American Higher Education (Washington DC: Wilson Center, 2018).

Cao Xueqin, The Story of the Stone, or the Dream of the Red Chamber, vol III: The Warning Voice, trans David Hawkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1981).

Jane Austin, Sense and Sensibility in Jane Austen: The Complete Novels (New York: Gramercy Books, 1981.)

Author whose name I cannot yet reveal, Unpublished book manuscript (hopefully 2019?).


Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalist Approach (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).

Cao Xueqin and Gao E, The Story of the Stone, or the Dream of the Red Chamber, vol IV: the Debt of Tears, trans. John Minford (New York: Penguin Books, 1982).

W. Michael Kelly, The Humongous Book of Algebra Problems 3rd ed, (Alpha: 2008).

Alex Rosenberg, How History Gets Things Wrong: The Neuroscience of our Addition to Stories (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018).

Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 40th anniversary ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Cao Xueqin and Gao E, The Story of the Stone, or the Dream of the Red Chamber, vol V: The Dreamer Wakes (New York: Penguins Books, 1986).

F.W. Mote, Imperial China, 900-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).


Shi Ji, 岳飞的故事 (Beijing: Sinolingua, 2017).

William Shakespeare, Poems in Globe Illustrated Shakespeare (New York: Greenwhich House, 1983), pp.2245-2323.



Books I Read a Significant Portion of, but Did Not Finish Completely:

Carles Boix, Political Order and Inequality: Their Foundations and their Consequences for Human Welfare; James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret; Jaak Panksepp, The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions; Kosuke Imai, Quantitative Social Science: An Introduction; Andrie de Vries and Joris Meys, R For Dummies, 2nd ed; Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, trans., The Zuo Tradition, vol II; Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning; Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics, 2nd ed; Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?; Ian Kershaw, To Hell and Back; Philip Mansel, Paris Between Empire Emily Anhalt, Enraged: Why Violent Times Need Ancient Greek Myths, James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom; Japan at War: An Oral History; The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology; Joseph Henrich et. al., Foundations of Human Sociality; Sanjit Dhami, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis; Paul Rouzer, A New Primer in Literary Chinese; Fang Xujun, 汉语相似词语区别与联系; Richard Elbreith and Robert Boyd, Mathmatical Models of Social Evolution; Patrick Juola and Stephen Ramsay, Mathmatics for the Humanist, Joe Stalworthy, ed, New Oxford Book of War Poetry.